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RCS draft a memo with instructions to DC/R

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: CA - Mr. Clubb

DATE: December 12, 1950

FROM: CA - Mr. Strong

Instructions sent to Paris + London File DC/R

SUBJECT: Information Regarding Guerrillas on the Mainland of China

In view of the possibility that consideration will be given to support and increasing the scope of guerrilla activities on the mainland of China, it might be advisable at an early date to inaugurate systematic efforts to gain the most accurate possible information regarding existing guerrilla (and bandit) forces, including names of leaders, strength, armament, communications, location, methods of operation, means of supply, liaison between or among groups, relations with nationalists (if any) and any other pertinent data.

The Chinese Communists have stated publicly, recently, that 200,000 bandits exist on the mainland, whereas the nationalists say 1-1/2 to 2 million. The nationalists claim great guerrilla activity while the communists recognize the bandits as a nuisance. In each instance the truth may be somewhere in between.

The suggestion which follows would entail considerable work for various of our field offices. It would also run the risk of revealing prematurely a suspicious interest in the guerrilla movement, suspicious to the communists, to the British who would fear our use of Hongkong, and to the Nationalists around Chiang who would fear that we were trying to develop a force to supplant the KMT and siphon off aid which the KMT now receives.

The best approach to the problem appears to be through our Embassy in Taipei, Consulate General in Hongkong, Consulate in Hanoi, Legation in Saigon and Embassy in Rangoon, which would endeavor to obtain official and unofficial information on the subject, in as standard form and content as possible. The various results could then be compared in the Department or by another agency to find where reports agree and where they disagree. Naturally in Hongkong and other posts, efforts should be made to avoid Nationalist-oriented sources in order that Taipei's information would not be compared with that of other Nationalist agents.

As a corollary, Hongkong and Hanoi might prepare a list of organizations and leaders and persons claiming a direct interest in the active opposition to the communist

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regime, and evaluate them from the standpoint of activity, purpose, possible leadership and utility.

Admittedly the foregoing is a big task, would take some time and would requirecaution. On the other hand, the undertaking of positive action in this field would require the effort, and our present information is sketchy and most unreliable. We should be able to come up with rather satisfactory data at least on South-Southeast China, which is most vulnerable anyhow from several standpoints.

In such a project, armed services attaché's and controlled American sources would be able to pool their efforts under direction of the Chief of Mission or Principal Officer.

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FE:CA:RCStrong:jr